by Sheila Carapico

"Middle East Report", Middle East Research and Information Project, Feb. 1998

 President Clinton has vowed to force Iraq "to comply with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspection regime and the will of the United Nations." Stopping UN chemical and biological weapons inspectors from "completing their mission," said the president in his State of the Union address, defies "the will of the world." American air strikes now, however, are likely to derail UNSCOM’s arms control mission.

Shunning alternative options such as a war crimes tribunal or arms control fora, the Clinton policy seems less concerned with Iraqi compliance or UNSCOM’s integrity than with perpetuating the economic embargo, on-going inspections, "no-fly zones," and periodic American air strikes. This policy, essentially a continuation of the Gulf War, enjoys broad (though not deep) domestic political support, and is consistent with national security dogma, but it is cavalier unilateralism based on dubious legal reasoning and a dangerous lack of foresight. Washington asserts that Security Council Resolution 678 of December, 1990 authorizes unilateral air strikes to force Iraq to accept what Secretary of State Madeline Albright is calling an "inspections regime." In 1993 and 1996, retaliation for military incursions into the "safe havens" US troops established for dissident Iraqi Kurds was justified under the controversial but recognizable and perhaps compelling doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In the current crisis, however, the US is declaring a mandate under SC678 to punish what Albright deems a "material breach" of that resolution.

This questionable position founders on issues that have plagued the UNSCOM regime all along. The Security Council's failure to specify the conditions Iraq must meet before sanctions are lifted leaves the matter open to interpretation. Many parties now argue for an easing of sanctions in light of the significant reduction in Iraq's conventional offensive arsenal supervised by UNSCOM even as the US and the UK insist their inspectors can ferret out secret chemical and biological laboratories. The UN has been sensitive about the neutrality and multi-nationality of UNSCOM inspections teams, whose personnel are nominated by their governments but are supposed to be drawn, with particular care, from as many countries and regions as possible, to avoid staffing with experts from "intelligence-providing states." The prominence of US and British inspectors in UNSCOM in addition to humanitarian considerations, questions of regional "balance," and past American unilateralism, make it possible for Iraq to win at least some sympathy for its contention that Anglos in all key UNSCOM positions are moving the goalposts, deliberately prolonging the inspections, and providing intelligence directly to governments that are in a state of war with Iraq.Indeed, current Anglo-American policy is to perpetuate indefinitely inspections, sanctions, military patrols, and the bombing option. The interests at stake are clear.

First, and foremost, the status quo keeps military forces in the Gulf to give the sanctions teeth. This is vital for CENTCOM, the Central regional Command that moved its strikes, however, do risk headquarters in 1990 from Tampa, Florida, for Desert Storm and remains in the region to patrol and punish Iraq. If Iraq were found to be in compliance with SC687, a significant proportion of the roughly 18,000 US forces in the Gulf who are now busy policing the "no fly zone" would be redeployed; base and pre-positioning rights, especially in Saudi Arabia, might have to be renegotiated. The sanctions regime abets long-standing policies of forward preparedness and intervention to control Persian Gulf exports to the rest of the world.

Second, despite the protection of trade sanctions against several major oil-exporting nations, petroleum prices are falling. Iraq's sale of oil on the free market might glut an already-saturated market, benefitting Iraq at the expense of two important sets of oil-exporting countries: the relatively prosperous economies of the Gulf kingdoms, already suffering politically destabilizing economic retrenchment; and other, more populous oil exporters whose sales barely cover interest on their foreign debts, most notably Mexico and Indonesia. For Indonesia alone, recently rescued from the brink of default, even a modest dip in the world price for its primary export could spell disaster. American aircraft exports have already suffered. Instability in energy prices could send shockwaves throughout the fuel, defense, and banking industries, especially given the current volatility in global stock markets.

Cognizant of the advantages of maintaining the sanctions regime and wary of the potential risks ("instability") associated with Iraqi compliance, the defense establishment is determined to continue the Gulf War whether or not the UN and our allies acquiesce. The US has dismissed the United Nations and international law on many occasions, for instance, in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, excluding UN and international involvement in the Oslo peace process, and the payment of UN dues, seeing legal arguments and multilateral mechanisms in realist terms, as the natural province of powerful nations who enforce international law when they see fit. Even if great powers do not feel bound by UN resolutions or international law, however, they must be sensitive to the political, humanitarian, and diplomatic implications of the enforcement actions they take.

Given the Iraqi government's history of aggression and genocide, the world's lone superpower should pursue legitimate arms control in a multilateral, replicable fashion, not through open-ended sanctions, inspections, and "collateral damage" that amounts to collective punishment. The Clinton-Blair gunboat bravado may well back-fire,

dealing mortal damage to the UNSCOM regime itself.