by Sergio Romano, "Corriere della Sera," March 7, 1998.

There is nothing substantially new to the Italian foreign policy with which Madeleine Albright has made her acquaintance in Rome in the past hours. The fathers of Dini’s visit to Teheran and of the joint Russian-Italian declaration are Fanfani, Moro and most of all Andreotti. In Franco Bernabè’s interview with the "Corriere della Sera" there are concepts that belong to Enrico Mattei, to the genetic heritage of Eni. Never, not even at the time of the cold war and of the Iranian revolution, have we stopped to look at the USSR and at the Middle East from a perspective different than that of Washington’s foreign policy. There are, however, new elements to which the American Secretary of State will have to pay attention. The first is the international situation. When in the seventies and eighties we wooed the Soviets, the Arabs and the Iranians in spite of Washington, the world was divided into two opposing blocks and the Italian diplomacy was forced to move with caution. Today, the end of the cold war gives Rome greater freedom of action. The Americans would prefer a less bold and audacious Italy but could hardly blame it for putting in danger, with its initiatives, the security of the West.

The second new element rests in the style of the government and in the scale of its politics. A few weeks ago colonel Gaddafi told Carlo Rossella and Maurizio Molinari of "la Stampa" that Libya is about to sign a far-reaching agreement with Italy. The news has not been denied. More recently, during the Iraqi crisis, Prodi signed a joint declaration with Eltsin, the person who had most strongly criticised American policies towards Baghdad. The importance of the event was immediately played down but the declaration remains. More recently still, the Foreign Secretary Dini, in Teheran, spoke in a way that gave credibility to the Iranian claims that Iran is foreign to islamist terrorism. In the Muslim and Arab world there are three oil producing countries against which the USA have ordered embargos and particular legislative sanctions: Libya, Iran and Iraq. With each one of these countries Italy pursues a policy that is radically different from that of the USA. These events give the Italian diplomacy a relevance and a profile which we are not used to. Now, the Italian government has an economic policy that is original and independent form the USA. We may approve or disapprove of it, but could not deny that its parts make up a visible and coherent framework.

The problem is that not everything in foreign policy is "economics." While Italy, in the Arab and Middle-Eastern world, takes initiatives that are coherent to its own interests, a part of its territory is occupied by bases which, if necessary, can represent the rear support of American politics in the region. For forty years Italy and America have been Siamese sisters, tied the one to the other by the American military presence on the Italian territory. During the cold war this presence could simply be left to the discretion of secret agreements. Today, at a time when the sisters risk heading in different directions, the circumstances impose that the bases and their use have to be publicly subjected to the "double key" discipline, with the right to veto from the Italian government. I understand why Prodi is hesitant to face the problem. If he did so, Communist Refoundation would not be satisfied only with a new statute for the bases but would demand that they be closed down. However, a state cannot lead an ambitious economic diplomacy and leave to others, without clear and transparent pacts, a fundamental instrument of its foreign policy. After having negotiated with Gaddafi, welcomed Eltsin and visited Teheran, the Italian government would do the right thing in remembering that the key to its foreign policy is still held by Washington.