Documenti
THE DAWN OF THE NEW MODEL OF DEFENSE
by Manlio Dinucci
Operation Alba [dawn] is the first application of the philosophy elaborated by the top echelons of the Armed Forces in accord with the New Model of Defense, to give "credibility and solidity to the international policy" of our country, safeguarding its "external interests."
Premier Romano Prodi has labeled it "a model for the future." Right he is. Operation Alba is undoubtedly a model, but we need to be clear as to the meaning of the term.
It has been presented as a humanitarian mission under the protective covering of a multinational force led by Italy. In other words, the use of the military is supposed to be simply a means for attaining a humanitarian, peaceful purpose. If that were the case, how come the deployment of military power is totally out of proportion to this declared end? In Operation Alba military helicopters and airplanes have been utilized, together with landing craft and mine sweepers, tanks and armored vehicles, raiders, marines, paratroopers - even the Navy flagship, the missile-launching cruiser Vittorio Veneto. There is enough military potential here for a full-fledged war operation to seize a territory defended by a well-armed, well-organized army!
A doubt springs to mind: is the use of military force the means or the end of Operation Alba? For the answer one must look beyond the immediate situation to the underlying concept, a policy not merely military, formulated by the top echelons of the armed forces in the wake of the Gulf War.
MODERN GUNBOAT POLICY
The main duty of the Italian armed forces, says the General Staff of Defense, is the "defense of external interests" which "is implemented in all areas of strategic interest where situations of instability, tension or crisis can arise, to safeguard national interests, in the context of multinational operations" (Modello di Difesa, 1995). General Franco Angioni, general secretary and national director of armaments, clarifies: "In substance, security is no longer to be confined within given geographical limits; it is necessary to have the will and the ability to project in the long and medium range, wherever risk situations arise that could quickly degenerate, involving national security and interests" (47th section of the Superior Studies Center for Defense [Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa], 1996).
How "security" links to "national interests" is explained by the Navy: stressing the "connection between the economic framework and the geo-strategic framework", the Navy notes in the 1995 report that "there can no longer be strong economies unless they are supported by strong foreign and security policies." To this end it is necessary to have "a quality military force in a position to sustain Italy's foreign policy," possessed of a "capacity to intervene rapidly wherever crises occur and integrate with international contingents" (Modello di Difesa, 1995).
Construction of this force is already under way. The Army is fortifying its professional component by recruiting long-term volunteers. According to Gen. Bonifazio Incisa di Camerana 36,000 need to be recruited (compared to the present 11,000) by "offering inducements to make the 'Army commodity' competitive on the job market." Youths who opt for the long hitch are guaranteed excellent economic conditions (in addition to salary, an indemnity for hazardous duty which in Albania amounts to about $2,000 per month, and a further $2,100 a month, tax-free). Upon leaving the service they will be hired virtually automatically into the local or national police forces, fire departments, forest rangers, as well as the civilian section of the Defense Department and other state administrations.
In support of the need to recruit "high quality professionals," Gen. Incisa di Camerana stated: "Let us keep in mind that the military organization steps in when the other state institutions are no longer in condition to face a situation" (47th session of the Superior Studies Center of Defense, 1996).
THE ONE AND ONLY IDEA ("PENSIERO UNICO")
Against this background the real purpose of Operation Alba shows clearly. It serves to determine Italy's "cut" of responsibilities on the basis of her readiness to use military force in defense of "external interests" and, at the same time, to evaluate her status and role in the international context.
It is less than startling that the top brass of the military should propose such a concept. What is striking is that it should be adopted by all the governments, from the first to the second republic, most recently by both the Berlusconi and Prodi governments. The concept - not merely a question of military policy but also of foreign politics and, hence, of what sort of society we want to build in our own country - is changing into a sort of "pensiero unico," [an unchallengeable idea] that cuts crosswise across the political spectrum, joining the right to a large sector of the "left".
Behind the ritual references to humanitarian ends and peace, the core substance of this "one and only idea" (pensiero unico) comes across with crystalline clarity: Italy is expected to enhance its military force to be wielded in conjunction with and as a function of the use of the economic force of its capital.
For this reason, it is not enough to discuss Operation Alba in the framework of the contingent situation. What must be debated are basic questions of goals and perspectives. However this operation turns out, one thing is certain: it will be used to justify the strengthening of the armed forces and, in this connection, the allocation of new resources (some $47 billion according to Gen. Angioni) for their "upgrading."
Once again the Italian working class will have to foot the bill, directly or indirectly, for the building up of the armed forces and their capacity to operate in defense of "external interests." And the workers will be the ones called upon to pay, through cuts in health and welfare imposed by reform policies, for the strengthening of Italian capital so that it can take part competitively in the sharing out of global resources.
translated by Gordon Poole