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![]() DocumentiTHREE DECADES OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN KOSOVOAll links connecting Serbs and Albanians have been severed. The territory remains to be the last seed of discord. But, if there is anything positive in all this, it is the fact that all cards are open now. We are witness to the clash of two irreconcilable national projects. It is clearer by day that neither is feasible...The Kosovo problem was with us and it stays with us. Like any other problem, which one tries not to notice, and then does something for the sake of doing, making sure it looks like it has been solved once and forever, such a problem is then bound to catch up with those who tried to escape it so diligently. It forces itself on the top of the agenda. Each time it is bigger than the time before. The Kosovo problem as well is bigger than it ever was. The question of control over those 10,887 square kilometres lies in the background of a much greater problem: the question of relations between Serbs and Albanians, who are divided by their national differences, but who, because they share the space they live in, are forced to learn to live with those who are different. The events that shook Kosovo over the last three decades demonstrate how the problem has grown so big so that even the greatest optimist would not dare think about solving it. All links connecting Serbs and Albanians have been severed. The territory remains the last seed of discord. But, if there is anything positive in all this, it is the fact that all cards are open now. We are witness to a clash of two irreconcilable national projects. It is clearer by day that neither is feasible. That contradiction might actually alleviate finding a solution. 1968: Two days before two state holidays, of the then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) and Albania (the Republic Day and the Flag Day on 29 November), on 27 November 1968, several thousand Albanian students took to the streets of Pristina and several other towns in Kosovo. They chanted: ``We want the republic;'' ``We want the Constitution;'' ``We want the University;'' ``We want the national flag;'' ``Down with the colonialist policy towards Kosovo;'' ``We want Presevo to be part of the Province;'' ``Long live the liberation movement of Kosovo;'' ``Long live Albania;'' ``Long live Enver Hoxha;'' ``One people, one state, one party;'' ``Long live marxism-leninism.'' They clashed with the police on the same day. The rioting began. Shop windows were smashed and cars overturned. One demonstrator was killed, and about forty demonstrators and members of security forces were injured. Twenty-two persons were arrested. It was the first mass national protest of the Albanians in SFRJ. The public received only brief information about these demonstrations from the Province's Committee of the Communist Party. The then SFRJ President Josip Broz Tito also played down their importance, saying that they should not be overly ``dramatised.'' Tirana was restrained as well. The only sign of solidarity from Albania was the assessment that the demonstrations were ``a noble act.'' That year Albania had left the Warsaw Pact after the Soviet invasion on Czechoslovakia and announced a foreign policy turn. It assured SFRJ that it would help it in case of an invasion from abroad which was unprecedented. The November demonstrations were a main topic of discussion in the Central Committees of the Communist Party at all levels. The condemnations of the demonstrations were reduced to the assessment that they were ``hostile and anti-Yugoslav.'' The slogans that referred to neighbouring Albania or to the communism of Enver Hoxha were most suspicious. The organisation of demonstrations was ascribed to a minority of extremists and chauvinists who were against brotherhood and unity of working people of Yugoslavia. The Albanian communists reiterated that they would persist on ``Tito's road.'' The trials of the arrested were not covered by the media, in order not to stir the polemics. Debates concerning the new constitutional profile of Kosovo were well underway in the constitutional commissions, from the federal down to the provincial level. Two days after the Brioni Plenum and the fall of Aleksandar Rankovic, the Yugoslav Interior Minister, whose time in office Kosovo Albanians would remember as the time of terror, paved the way for a greater equality in the field of national rights. The Albanians' mass protest in Kosovo was an obvious indication of their dynamic national awakening, but also of impatience and desire that the national affirmation of the Albanians be confirmed in a concrete way. However, it is precisely this that made the Serbs feel increasingly insecure and afraid. In addition, it also caused Serbs' resistance to the constitutional changes. The constitutional amendments were adopted in December 1968 and June 1971. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija became the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The Province was granted its own Constitutional Law, so that the autonomy was increasingly regulated by the province rather than the republic (Serbia) or the federation. Along with the constitutional assertion of the province, the term national minority was removed. It was replaced by the term nationality, which was a sign of symbolic advance in the sphere of national equality. The process of the constitutional change was crowned by the adoption of the new Constitution of SFRJ on 21 February 1974. The federal state was decentralised. The provinces became ``constitutional elements of the federation,'' but also remained a part of Serbia. The SFRJ Constitution represented major headway in the constitutional position of Kosovo in the federation. Due to the ethnic make-up of the province, in which the Albanians were the majority population, it also represented their national affirmation. However, the 1974 Constitution failed to satisfy the Albanians, and especially the Serbs. The Albanians had clearly demanded that Kosovo be a republic and that they be recognised as a nation. The Serbs perceived it as a division of Serbia into three parts and the weakening of its position in the Federation. The promotion of autonomy revealed the crux of the Kosovo problem: it surfaced as a question of a winner and a loser. One party would always regard itself to be a loser, the Serbs or the Albanians, depending on who was in power. Meanwhile, Kosovo underwent rapid economic development, especially from the point it was at in 1947. Right after World War II, 81 per cent of all employees had worked in agriculture, and only 16,000 people had been employed in industrial branches. The level of illiteracy had been 55 per cent. The Kosovo Albanian officials said that a ``spectacular development'' had taken place in the province. This was true, but only in certain spheres. The greatest advance was recorded in the area of education. In 1979, 307,000 students were attending primary schools and 74,728 were enrolled in high-schools. Some 40,000 full---and part-time student studied at the University in Pristina. There had been a significant rise in non productive jobs. The local administration had grown considerably as well. Out of 178,000 employed, as many as 46,000, or nearly a third, were employed in non-productive, and only 132,000 in productive branches of the economy. However, even though it was developing at an accelerated pace, Kosovo was irreparably falling behind all other parts of SFRJ. This is despite the fact that the development of the province had been given special priority, and the fact that millions of U.S. dollars from the Federal Development Fund, but also from the credits for development approved by the World Bank were pouring into the province. No investments were made in modern industry. There was disproportional spending on spectacular projects, which did look impressive, but failed to reduce unemployment. The average annual income per capita in SFRJ was 2,635 dollars in 1979. In Kosovo, it amounted to less than a third, that is 795 dollars. The worker employed in the southern Serbian province earned 180 dollars a month in 1980, whereas the average monthly salary in SFRJ was 235 dollars, or a third more. The population of Kosovo, which then comprised 6.8 per cent of the total population of SFRJ, contributed only 2.9 per cent to the SFRJ's GDP. The same year, Kosovo had only 2.4 per cent of the total number of cars in SFRJ, and 2.5 per cent of TV and radio sets. In the period between 1971 and 1981, the unemployment rate in Kosovo grew from 18.6 to 27.5 per cent. The post-war period was marked by a rapid growth of population. Since the end of World War II, the number of people in Kosovo rose from 716,000 to 1.550,000. This rapid growth of the population is not surprising when the high annual birth rate is considered: 44 to 1,000. 1981: The wave of demonstrations staged by Kosovo Albanians in the spring of 1981, but especially the polemics in their aftermath, showed clearly that the intensive development of the province may have solved some problems, but also created a host of new ones. The radically changed ethnic picture of the province emerged as an additional cause of ever greater tensions, and would emerge as a key factor in the Serbian-Albanian confrontation in the latter part of the 1980s. The share of the Serbian population in Kosovo dropped from 18.3 to 13.2 per cent, and the share of the Montenegrin population fell from 2.5 to 1.7 per cent in the period between 1971 and 1981. Apart from a high birth rate among Kosovo Albanians, it was also the emigration of more than 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo that tipped the demographic scales in favour of the Albanians. The Kosovo events of March and April 1981 were a shock to the then Yugoslav public, but also to the leading Communists. Stane Dolanc, the member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, openly said at a press conference to local and foreign journalists (6 April 1981), that he was surprised by the ``intensity'' of the demonstrations in Kosovo. The journalists, as well as the public, had an additional reason for surprise. Apart from a brief information on the late evening TV news of 12 March, that ``student riots'' which were ``socially damaging'' had taken place in Pristina and a few lines at the bottom of the page on April 2nd, there were no reports from Kosovo---neither on TV, radio or in the newspapers. The public learned ``orally'' about the events. There were rumours that war was being waged in Kosovo. The confirmation of the rumours that the situation in Kosovo was serious was headline news in the papers on April 3rd, which carried a debate of the Political Actif of Kosovo concerning the measures of stabilisation in Kosovo. In other words, only after everything was over, did the public learn that the ``counterrevolution'' was taking place in Kosovo, without even knowing what had actually happened there. The official report about the demonstrations was published at the end of April. CONDITIONS, CONDITIONS: Since 11 March, when the riots in the student dining hall in Pristina first broke out, Kosovo was swept by waves of demonstrations. A direct cause for the protest of the Albanian youth was bad food and general discontent with student living standards. Students shouted: ``Conditions, Conditions!'' The mass of students spilled over into the streets of the provincial capital. The number of demonstrators rose to 2,000. There were clashes with the police, but the situation calmed down later in the evening. The next wave of demonstrations began on March 26th, the same day that Pristina expected the arrival of the Youth Baton in honour of Tito's birthday. Students gathered together on the campus and set off for the city centre. They were stopped by a police cordon and again clashed with the police. Twenty-three demonstrators and thirteen policemen were injured. Twenty-one demonstrators were arrested. The third wave of demonstrations on April 1st was most massive and it spread throughout the province. Students were joined by their juniors from highschool, workers and other citizens. The first Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) units entered the city in the early evening hours. Tear-gas was used to disperse the demonstrators. The official reports said that demonstrators were hurling stones and shooting at security forces, but also that the police used fire-arms ``in self-defence.'' Eight demonstrators lost their lives; seventy-five were wounded, of which 55 sustained injuries from fire-arms. One policeman was killed, three were seriously injured, and 125 sustained light injuries (it was later reported that two policemen lost their lives). The official report also says that the above mentioned figures were based on the number of people who reported to the clinics and sought medical aid. This means that the number of wounded, and, even, the number of dead, was probably much higher. A state of emergency was proclaimed in Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians' protests and the demands for better socio-economic conditions soon transformed into national demands. As in the 1968 demonstrations , the following slogans were heard in 1981: ``We want the republic;'' ``We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs;'' ``Kosovo to Kosovars;'' ``While Trepca's working, Belgrade's being built;'' ``We want jailed friends;'' ``Long live Adem Demaci;'' ``Long live the brotherhood of the Albanian people;'' ``Long live marxism-leninism.'' These were followed by slogans with a clear social and economic meaning: ``Some sit in armchairs, some without bread;'' ``For how much longer in the cellars;'' ``No conversation with the red bourgeoisie;'' ``Long live the working class.'' MERGING: The young generation of Kosovo Albanians, which comprised 52 per cent of the total population of Kosovo, expressed dissatisfaction with the general situation in Kosovo. Ten thousand graduates of the University of Kosovo could not hope to find any job after completing their studies, let alone a job in their profession. For example, forty university graduates applied for one opening for a courier in Kosovo. Employment in some other Yugoslav republic was not a possibility, primarily due to language barriers, but also because the republics believed that the level of competence of Albanian graduates from Kosovo was inadequate. Social demands merged with national demands. Nonetheless, this was a protest with several dimension. However, the response of the leading communists reduced it to only one dimension: ideological. The demonstrations were proclaimed as a ``counterrevolution.'' This term signified the attack on everything Yugoslav: on brotherhood and unity, self-management, non-alignment, but also on territorial integrity. The first assessments coming from the communist fora mentioned unidentified ``hostile elements'' in Kosovo. Tirana was not being accused at first. The students were apologetically described as ``misled youth.'' However, everything ``crystallised'' overnight. Two moments were decisive. Unlike Albania's reaction to the Kosovo Albanians' demonstrations in 1968, the organ of the Albanian Workers' Party ``Zeri i Popullit'' responded to the Kosovo events in the early days of April. It severely condemned the brutality in suppressing the demonstrations, openly supported the demand for the republic of Kosovo, directing it's criticism against the Serbian leadership. The state press in SFRJ, but also the speeches delivered by the communist leaders in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo launched a counterattack. Thus began the ``war of words'' between SFRJ and Albania which would last for the next ten years, even after the death of Enver Hoxha. A cooling of the Yugoslav-Albanian relations ensued, but not the rupture of economic relations. Albania was accused of interference in the internal affairs of SFRJ, of attempting to subvert its stability in co-operation with emigrants in the West but also with the marxist leninist groups in Kosova. Albania refused all these allegations, but it continued to support the national demands of the Albanians in Kosovo. The response of the Albanian paper came at the right time when the culprit was being sought. One foe was identified. It was a foreign foe. The internal enemy was missing. UNIVERSITY: The finger was pointed at the University of Kosovo. At the session of the National Defence Board of the Federal Parliament, Executive Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, Milan Daljevic, criticised the professors and the academics for failing to condemn the demonstrations, and declared the University in Prisina a ``bastion of nationalism.'' Then came an avalanche of reports that the University was not an institution of higher learning but a centre for indoctrination of young people. The newspapers were full of reports of alleged ovations that the visiting professors from Albania received in Kosovo, about the ideologically coloured textbooks, etc... Tiny articles which informed that all visiting professors were not left alone and always had someone ``to keep them company'' while in Kosovo, or that all textbooks imported from Albania were first revised before being used in the province were overlooked. Henceforth, the University in Pristina would be exclusively mentioned as a spring of nationalism. Summer vacation at the University had begun two months earlier. In only a few months' time, 210 professors and lecturers were sacked, 260 received a ban on further education in high-schools and at the University, while 1,240 students lost their scholarships. Of those who were given terms in jail, seven years on average, but often between 12 and 15 years, the majority were men and women in their early twenties. The number of students was reduced by a third. In 1978, there were 17,000 freshmen at the University in Pristina, and in 1984 that number was reduced to 11,589. At the same time, there was a re-orientation of students from humanities to technical sciences, so that there were three times more technical students than their counterparts studying humanities. The official explanation was that the needs of the economy should be harmonised with the students' specialisations. Such an explanation did not go down well with the Albanian students whose possibilities to study their language and history were so drastically limited. In the meantime, cultural links with Albania were unilaterally severed. The exchange of professors between the Universities in Pristina and Tirana came to a halt. The textbooks imported from Albania were removed from the teaching process. Plans for the translation of Serbian textbooks into Albanian were made. ``Rilindja,'' the daily paper in the Albanian language published in Kosovo, stopped reporting on the news from Albania, including the results of the Albanian football league. The Pristina Television stopped broadcasting the programmes that were imported from Albania within the framework of the agreement on co-operation in the sphere of culture. A year later, in Kosovo, according to the report of the Provincial Secretary for Interior Affairs, 33 illegal groups were discovered, and 350 people were identified in connection with these groups. Mass arrests, sackings from work and from the communist party began. The process of ``differentiation,'' or, simply, purges, began as well. Over one thousand communists were expelled from the communist party, including those in the highest positions like Mahmut Bakali. The security situation was assessed as good. The ``enemy'' was still being mentioned. But, the ``enemy'' was now acting secretly, using shrewd methods. Denisa Kostovic The author is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Geography, Cambridge University, U.K. Sources used in this survey of the Kosovo events from 1968-1990 are: the Serbian press, the Albanian press from Kosovo and from Albania, the RFE/RL Background Reports, as well as academic articles and monographs published here and abroad which deal with various aspects of the Kosovo problem.
(taken from "Vreme", October 6, 1997) |